As the world increasingly relies on the oceans for food, energy, employment, and environmental solutions, maritime security is becoming an important discussion topic among policymakers, policy implementers, and researchers. This is because the maritime space is under increasing threats, resulting from the overexploitation of fish stocks through both legal fishing and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy and armed robbery at sea, illegal oil bunkering, toxic waste dumping, drugs and human trafficking, and other illegal activities. Indeed, there has been a steep increase in global maritime insecurity since the end of the Cold War, which saw a decrease in naval sizes and has impacted state enforcement capacity. At the same time, surplus weapons, technology and vessels were acquired by organised criminal networks – such as pirates and terrorists.
While the last decades witnessed the rise of transnational public-private initiatives to enhance maritime security and had some success mitigating security risks to economic activities on the high seas, many threats are highly persistent in their effects on coastal states and communities, particularly on the African continent. The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) has become one of the global hotspots of maritime insecurity due to prevalent IUU fishing, piracy, armed robbery, oil theft and illegal oil bunkering. The reasons for that include a limited capacity for regional states to monitor and control activities at sea, as many countries cannot devote necessary resources to address maritime insecurity.
The colonial roots of maritime insecurity are also worth noting, as conflict over maritime borders is a major factor undermining maritime law enforcement cooperation and collaboration. The European partition of Africa, in particular, created numerous border conflicts, weakening state capacity and making maritime jurisdictions unclear. Following the end of colonialism, states worked to avoid secessionism and civil wars, which affected their investment in their navies. These, along with regional institutions with limited capacity and debt-ridden economies, place colonialism at the root of African nations' limited maritime capabilities.
Though traditional narratives define maritime security in terms of the presence or absence of actual threats, academic engagement in this area often fails to adequately consider maritime domain awareness (MDA). As Boraz argues, a key misinterpretation that has caused this literary and policy gap is the myth that navies and security agencies have always ‘done’ MDA. While the need for situational awareness has always been recognised and pursued in the maritime sector, MDA as a cohesive approach is a relatively recent concept that has emerged in response to the rapid growth in security threats, data sources and maritime networks. Though technologies such as RADAR and Automatic Identification System (AIS) are long-established, the limits to their capacity have driven the development of MDA. As writes, “what surveillance systems cannot do is to put the data they generate into context. They cannot, in other words, reveal purpose or intention.” This is perhaps the most significant role of MDA: contextualisation of data, which allows maritime security actors to take informed actions to tackle threats at sea.
In discussing the centrality of MDA to maritime security in the GoG, Gilpin argues that the prevailing "land-centric" security approach, where national law enforcement agencies primarily focus on land-based threats, contributes to the lack of MDA in the region and by extension, the increased insecurity at sea. Consequently, combating maritime insecurity in the GoG has involved addressing the limited (asymmetric) capabilities of regional countries through collective capacity building. This effort is centred around improving MDA tools and is fostered by international cooperation and collaboration. Considering the multi-layered responsibilities of the maritime security sector, write that while strong governance and enforcement capacity is necessary for securing maritime areas, “first and foremost though, we [the international maritime community] must understand the maritime domain and what is going on within it, so that we can formulate good policy, effectively deploy assets and ensure the uninterrupted flow of commerce.” With this assertion, the authors establish MDA as not just a central component of maritime security but as a mandatory precondition to all other aspects of maritime security. It is through this lens that we seek to establish our own understanding of maritime security, wherein the extent and success of maritime security is defined by the attainment of MDA. As Doorey suggests, the key to protecting a country's maritime domain is a timely and comprehensive understanding of all maritime activity in its inland waterways, territorial seas, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and high seas. Thomas takes this further, arguing that maritime situational awareness is a critical component of maritime security; we adopt this to form our understanding of maritime security and inform our exploration of MDA-enhancing technologies that, under this new definition, are essential to securing maritime environments.
In the GoG, technology has proved to be a promising path to enhance regional capacity to address security threats at sea. This involves using technologies to boost MDA, facilitating improved information gathering, communication, and interventions and fostering smoother cooperation among various security actors within and across nations. The Yaoundé Architecture, established by the Yaoundé Code of Conduct 2013, is at the core of these efforts. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct is an international framework encompassing norms, conventions, and organizations and the Architecture serves as a platform for regional and international collaboration in maritime security, incorporating multi-level capacity building, information-sharing mechanisms, and operational cooperation. The international community has rallied behind the GoG states to address security threats, as evident in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 2018 (2011), 2039 (2012), and 2634 (2022). While these resolutions primarily emphasised piracy and armed robbery at sea, they urged GoG states to collaborate in countering security threats in their region. This shift has established a regional imperative for MDA and actions against maritime insecurity, moving the region's focus from receiving security assistance to enhancing regional capacity through collaborations with coastal states.
To understand the extent to which regional agencies in the GoG are deploying technology for MDA and information sharing to enhance maritime security, we ask, what are the opportunities and challenges associated with using technologies for maritime security in the GoG? Our research advances our understanding of the subject area by being the first to present empirical evidence on the opportunities, successes, and challenges of using technology for maritime security on the African continent based on the realities of the GoG countries. In addition, as 2023 marks the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, our research contributes to the literature by assessing how technology has helped the region achieve some of the agreement's key objectives, which include improving regional safety and security through enhanced information sharing. Using primary data from questionnaires distributed to key strategic and operational organisations focused on maritime safety and security in the GoG, and the review of literature and policy documents, we argue that technology has improved MDA and information sharing and, resultantly, maritime security in the GoG. However, the use of maritime technology must be complemented with necessary human resources and relevant assets (e.g., surface and air) for a sustainable outcome. Although technologies for maritime security more broadly would include those deployed for port monitoring and security, container control, digitisation of vessel navigation systems, MDA and information sharing, we limit our analysis to technologies deployed mainly for information gathering and sharing by the navies and coast guards.
To explore the opportunities, successes, and challenges associated with the use of technologies for maritime security, our paper is structured as follows. The introductory section is succeeded by a literature review that underscores the role of MDA technologies in enhancing maritime security. Following this, we detail the research methodology. Subsequent sections include the presentation of findings, commencing with the successful implementation of technology, and then moving on to the challenges faced and the corresponding solutions. Our paper concludes with a section dedicated to implications and overall conclusions.
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From sea blindness to sea vision: maritime domain awareness as central to maritime security
Territorial states have long sought to extend their governing capacity and control over the sea, and yet oceans remain an elusive space for many coastal states due to limited capacity resulting from lack of access to infrastructure, technology and technical know-how. The vast nature of the marine environment raises the costs for states to monitor activities at sea. This ultimately translates into a security issue, impairing states’ capacity to identify threats and sanction misbehaviour. Nevertheless, the centrality of maritime activities for the world economy has pushed states, international organisations, and private actors to establish joint efforts to try and render the sea governable.
Central to these efforts are initiatives that leverage technology to amplify the capabilities of states and other pertinent stakeholders in rendering the maritime domain more visible. The evolution of MDA is intrinsically linked to the rise of technologies promising to enhance states' surveillance capabilities. The progress in information technology has facilitated the creation of more efficient platforms for collecting, integrating, analysing, and sharing such data. This, in turn, has enabled the translation of MDA into a heightened maritime situational awareness, generating a comprehensive database of information, often in real-time. This information serves as a foundation for planning and targeting various maritime security operations, including but not limited to vessel interceptions and inspections at sea.
The initial development of MDA was limited by the capacities of available technologies, which historically have been RADAR and satellite imagery. Both have differing advantages and limitations: land-based RADAR is relatively low-cost (both in terms of installation and operation) and can operate in all weather conditions but has a small sensor area. Space-based satellite imagery covers a large area but is expensive to install and operate while not providing persistent monitoring.
A key limitation of these technologies is their precision – the limited sensor resolution of RADAR makes it difficult to determine whether a detected object is a ship, while the pixel resolution required for wide-area satellite imaging is often unable to detect small vessels.
Even when a ship is detected, it is nearly impossible to ascertain its identity through RADAR or satellite imagery alone; additionally, these technologies cannot identify vessel activity, meaning illegal activity cannot be tracked. While RADAR and satellite imaging have provided a useful starting point for enhancing MDA, their numerous disadvantages, combined with rapid growth in global maritime activity, have meant that maritime security stakeholders can no longer reliably use them without complementary data from other technologies.
Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) data, if properly utilised, is highly valuable for maritime stakeholders, from maritime security enforcement authorities such as navies and coastguards to fisheries regulators. Though originally developed as a tool to enhance vessel safety and collision avoidance through Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), the benefits that AIS vessel tracking would provide to MDA were quickly recognised.
In contrast to RADAR or satellite systems, which provide information either infrequently or on request, AIS transmits vessel identification data several times per minute, allowing for real-time tracking of vessels.
Additionally, as opposed to previous reliance on VTS and RADAR, AIS is not restricted to port areas; instead, it utilises a combination of satellite and terrestrial systems for data transmission, thus creating a global monitoring system.
The significance of this final point cannot be overstated, as previous monitoring systems were either terrestrial and thus could not capture shipping activity outside near-coast zones or space-based, which had a wider range but low frequency of data capture.
AIS combines the two systems to establish extensive coverage and a standardised and cheap means of tracking vessel activity. In contrast to the relatively incidental application of AIS to MDA, VMS was developed specifically for vessel tracking in the shipping and fisheries industry, making it, by some accounts, a more accurate and reliable monitoring system. Though it transmits data at a much lower rate than AIS and in one direction (i.e. ship to shore), VMS systems are typically closed and privately operated, and opposed to the public nature of AIS – this makes them a more secure, albeit costly, option for improving vessel monitoring and security at sea.
A major challenge posed by the growing reliance on VMS and AIS is vessels “going dark”, whereby communications and data reporting are switched off, allowing illegal activity to be obscured. In a recent meta-analysis, Welch et al. showed that, between 2017 and 2019, up to 6% of global fishing vessel activity was obscured by AIS disabling, roughly equating to 4.9 million hours of fishing activity. Though switching off AIS is in contravention of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), captains argue that doing so hides their position from pirates; however, even for legitimate vessels, this poses a risk as it limits their ability to avoid collisions in congested areas
Some vessels may go to even further lengths to obscure their activity, such as exploiting the poor cybersecurity of AIS reporting systems to introduce false signals to the system.
Additionally, though the installation of AIS is mandatory on large ships under International Maritime Organisation (IMO) regulations, there is no requirement for the system to be present on small commercial vessels, while the use of VMS is legislated on a national basis.
As a result, there are significant gaps in AIS and VMS reporting and data transmission, in addition to vessels going dark, mandating additional monitoring technologies to close these gaps.
Recent technological innovations are helping close these gaps, most notably Synthetic Aperture RADAR (SAR) and Vessel Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS). SAR is, in essence, a more advanced version of traditional RADAR that can observe areas in any weather conditions and at any point in the day; additionally, the imaging and data it produces are of a significantly higher resolution compared to traditional RADAR, allowing for vessel activity and position to be recorded.
The proliferation of data processing algorithms means that vessels can be tracked and illegal activity identified much faster and with greater efficiency.
. A further extension of this technology is in identifying trends in “dark zones”. SAR can be used to identify areas in which ships frequently disable their tracking systems, which allows maritime security authorities to identify zones of high importance for tackling illegal activity at sea.
However, SAR still presents maritime security enforcement actors with the issues typically associated with satellite-based imaging, namely that it is a highly expensive system and can only observe a specific area every few days due to satellite orbit patterns
VIIRS, on the other hand, is a system that detects light sources – this system greatly strengthens vessel tracking at night, which is when a significant proportion of illegal maritime activity, particularly IUU fishing, takes place.
Regarding fishing, VIIRS presents an especially useful technological solution as night-time fishing often uses high-powered lights to attract fish – though this is often legal, it is a fishing method that lends itself to illegal and over-exploitative fishing, thus making VIIRS an exceptionally powerful tool to detect fishing vessels that are operating illegally.
Thus, technological solutions such as these are essential for closing information and monitoring gaps when vessels disable their AIS to conceal illegal activity or fail to install AIS or VMS systems altogether.
A final technology that is in the early stages of development but has high potential for improving MDA is autonomous sensor networks. These networks, like information-sharing networks, are primarily used for risk identification - for example, Carapezza and Bucklin.
proposed a low-cost sensor network that can be used to identify and track submerged threat objects such as submarines or uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs). In contrast to most current monitoring systems, which rely solely on waterborne sensors, the strength of these networks lies in their combination of in-water and on-shore sensors, resulting in a more resilient and reliable system.
Similarly, Ismail make a case for using uncrewed surface vehicles and UUVs for remote sensing and monitoring, the latter of which, at the time of publication, included models capable of diving to depths of up to 6000 m. While this technology is still in its early stages and has a high financial cost, it has great potential for augmenting existing monitoring systems and expanding threat detection capabilities.
A common issue in the literature on MDA-enhancing technologies is data gaps, which are particularly pervasive since all technological solutions have inherent limitations. As such, it is of high importance that MDA systems are not used in isolation and that data is instead synthesised to establish a more accurate information system which can track vessel identity, activity, movements and interactions to most effectively ‘map’ the maritime domain
However, the maritime sector has historically grappled with significant barriers to information sharing – first and foremost is the “culture of secrecy” promoted by security stakeholders, whereby the inherent perception is that making data open and accessible makes shipping more vulnerable, thereby rendering information-sharing undesirable.
Furthermore, in areas of corrupt governments, information-sharing enhances the potential for collusion between maritime security officials and criminals. This also creates a culture of mistrust, whereby shipping and fishing companies are reluctant to voluntarily share data due to fear that weak governance and corruption will result in the mishandling of criminal activity reports.
Infrastructural and financial issues also pose a serious barrier – this creates an overreliance on external actors to fund technological systems and install and maintain infrastructure where governments lack the domestic resources to devote to maritime security.
The outsourcing of MDA investment and capacity-building also risks power being automatically delegated to the financer of the networks and technologies, thus further disenfranchising governments who already have agendas set and political priorities defined by foreign governments. Adding further insight, Vogel argues that institutional incentives exacerbate this issue, where African governments invest heavily in front-line capacity while neglecting the informational networks that support these operations. Finally, African coastal states have limited capacity to analyse data before sharing, which, combined with the multiplicity of data sources, information-sharing networks and systems of persecution, creates a highly complex and multi-layered data-sharing regime.
This network complexity, combined with the sheer volume of data, can overwhelm databases and analysts, rendering information-sharing networks inoperable and, by extension, undermine efforts to ensure security at sea effectively.
Technological systems are being developed to address these issues with data sharing – these allow coastal states and maritime security authorities to not only access but share information on maritime activity, thus establishing networks of MDA. In regions with low technological capacity, such as the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), these systems have typically been sourced from external partners, such as Skylight, SOLARTA (developed by the UK government) and SeaVision (developed by the US Navy)
In the GoG, a specific MDA information-sharing system has been developed Рthe Yaound̩ Architecture Regional Information System (YARIS). Developed by the EU Gulf of Guinea Interregional Network (GoGIN) Project in support of Article 2.3 of the Yaound̩ Architecture, YARIS is a high-tech information system that integrates chat, email and video conferencing ; additionally, the system integrates multiple data sources, such as AIS, VMS, RADAR and satellite data, which makes it more accurate and responsive than traditional single-source databases.
Although all these tools play important roles in enhancing MDA and contributing to maritime security, there is a need to complement them with other approaches to enhance data collection and information sharing. Looking to the Western Indian Ocean, Bueger notes that as opposed to data-sharing or developing high-tech information-sharing platforms, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre and the Information Fusion Centre, have built reputation and visibility by compiling and sharing regular reports on regional maritime security developments. This helps to make information accessible while at the same time increasing the transparency and legitimacy of maritime security operations, thus facilitating cooperation. There is also a role for communities in contributing to maritime security through MDA. Such is the case of Pakistan’s Joint Maritime Information Coordination Centre, where staff regularly visit coastal communities. This allows maritime security operatives to hear concerns on maritime sustainability and security issues while establishing the Centre as a first point of contact when communities observe suspicious or criminal activity . This is essential work, as it positions maritime security authorities as legitimate and trustworthy while establishing a network for rapid data sharing to complement surveillance technologies.
Community reporting systems prove especially effective when national maritime security authorities lack the resources for independent monitoring of maritime security threats. A good example is the K3M app in Malaysia, which allows fishers and coastal resort owners to report maritime security threats.
The role of technology in MDA and maritime security capacity is crucial and undeniable. Our research provides a comprehensive evaluation of technology integration in maritime security practices since adopting the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in 2013. We have utilized questionnaire data to analyze the perspectives of maritime security practitioners associated with the Yaoundé Architecture on the successes, challenges, and areas that need improvement in the use of technology in maritime security.