Beyond the Battlefield: Understanding the Roots of Armed Insurgencies in Africa

Edited by: Widad WAHBI

Over the past two decades, Africa has increasingly become a hotspot of chronic insecurity, marked by the resurgence and expansion of non-state armed groups. Today, more than 35 armed conflicts are active across the continent, with violence concentrated in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, and the Central African Republic. This phenomenon is not merely the result of isolated tensions, but rather the outcome of a convergence of political fragility, social disintegration, extreme poverty, and transnational geopolitical pressures—often aggravated by foreign interventions that are sometimes strategic, sometimes erratic.

At the core of this surge lies the erosion of state authority. In many African countries, governance remains heavily centralized, with little or no state presence outside capital cities. Basic public services such as education, healthcare, and security are virtually absent in large rural areas, creating a vacuum quickly filled by armed groups who present themselves as providers of order, protection, or even justice. Widespread corruption further erodes the legitimacy of central governments, turning them into recruitment tools for rebel movements.

Several emblematic cases highlight this collapse. The disintegration of Libya in 2011 unleashed a torrent of weapons and fighters across the Sahel, fueling rebellions in Mali. In the Central African Republic, the 2013 coup triggered brutal intercommunal violence between Séléka and anti-balaka militias. In eastern Congo, more than 100 armed groups continue to operate freely in a landscape shaped by resource wars and institutional abandonment.

Economic despair is another critical factor. Deep-rooted poverty, widespread unemployment, and the absence of viable futures have made many communities easy targets for recruitment. A UNDP study confirms that ideology is rarely the main reason individuals join extremist groups—more often, it is the hope of securing a job or income. In some areas, militias replace the state not only by offering money but also by stepping in as a de facto authority.

Natural resources also play a dangerous role. Gold, coltan, ivory, and timber are no longer just economic assets—they are tools of war. In the Sahel, jihadist groups profit from illegal mining and impose their own taxation systems. Where the formal economy fails, the informal war economy flourishes.

But the story is not just one of poverty and power vacuums—it is also deeply shaped by identity and exclusion. Ethnic, religious, and regional divisions are often at the heart of these conflicts. In Nigeria, Boko Haram exploits longstanding grievances between the marginalized Muslim north and the wealthier, Christian south. In the Central African Republic, the temporary domination of the Muslim-majority Séléka triggered violent Christian militia reprisals. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab draws strength from disenfranchised clans left outside the state-building process. In all cases, narratives of marginalization are used by armed groups to legitimize their violence and mobilize support.

Human rights abuses committed by state security forces further fuel this cycle. Many former fighters have testified that they joined armed movements after experiencing arrest, torture, or witnessing massacres by the army. In these situations, ideology often comes after trauma and personal loss. The motivations behind joining are frequently rooted more in fear, revenge, or desperation than religious belief or political conviction.

The trajectories of well-known armed groups illustrate these dynamics. Boko Haram emerged from socio-economic frustrations, violent state repression, and radical religious messaging, and has killed tens of thousands across the Lake Chad Basin since 2009. Al-Shabaab, based in Somalia, has embedded itself in weak state structures and clan networks, resisting even regional military coalitions. The Lord’s Resistance Army, active in Uganda and the Central African Republic, blended mystical ideology with extreme violence and child abductions. In the Sahel, jihadist and separatist coalitions have continuously adapted, blending ethnic grievances with religious radicalism to expand their control in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

These conflicts are no longer local—they reflect broader geopolitical fractures. The fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, the global war on terror, and the growing influence of Russian private military companies like Wagner have reshaped the balance of power on the continent. Foreign military involvement—whether by France, the UN, the US, or Russia—has not always brought stability. Often it has led to new tensions, charges of neocolonialism, and fresh cycles of radicalization.

Ultimately, the rise of armed groups in Africa is the product of intersecting internal and external failures: failed governance, chronic poverty, social injustice, and competing international agendas. Military responses alone are not enough—and may even prove counterproductive if they are not accompanied by deeper structural reforms. Only a holistic strategy that combines institutional rebuilding, economic inclusion, social equity, and regional cooperation can offer a path toward lasting peace. Without such an approach, the continent risks remaining caught in an unending spiral of violence, with armed groups feeding off the very crises they help perpetuate.